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Executive Summary 
 
 Interpol warns of carbon fraud1 
Carbon Markets Rocked by Credits Fraud2 
 
Carbon credit markets are in the early stages of development and media headlines such as 
these illustrate emerging levels of concern and foreboding over the potential for fraudulent 
crime within these markets. Australian companies are continuing to venture into the largely 
unregulated voluntary carbon credit market to offset their emissions and / or give their 
customers the opportunity to be ‘carbon neutral’. Accordingly, the voluntary market has seen 
a proliferation of carbon brokers that offer tailored offset carbon products according to need 
and taste. 
 
With the instigation of the Australian compliance market and with pressure increasing for 
political responses to combat climate change, we would expect Australian companies to 
experience greater exposure to carbon products in both compliance and voluntary markets. 
This paper examines the risks of carbon fraud in these markets by reviewing cases of actual 
fraud and analysing and identifying contexts where risks of carbon fraud are most likely. The 
summary of our findings are: 
 
1. In terms of perceptions: 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/interpol-warns-of-carbon-fraud/story-e6freo8c-1225733540371 
2 Oil Daily (Aug 25, 2010) 
• There are huge concerns regarding fraud in carbon markets as evidenced in the 
national and international media and in NGO commentary. Reasons for these 
anxieties are generalised but this does not stop the potential for fraud in the offset 
project market and with fraudulent carbon brokers from attracting considerable 
attention.   
• The fear of fraud and attendant high levels of media interest are partially driven by the 
highly politicised nature of global warming and carbon market mechanisms. 
 
2. In terms of reality: 
 
• Significant fraud in terms of number and market value of incidents has occurred in the 
EU ETS compliance market through VAT scams (carousel fraud) and internet 
‘phishing’.  
• Isolated instances of fraud have occurred or are suspected in the ‘broking’ of carbon 
offset credits in the voluntary market.  
• Investment scammers have moved into the voluntary carbon market. 
• In the carbon offset project market, only a few suspected cases of fraud have been 
reported and these mostly concern accusations of deception of local indigenous 
people (PNG and Peru) or bribery of government officials (Liberia). 
 
3. In terms of risk: 
 
• On compliance cap-and-trade markets: EU ETS frauds were mainly due to poorly 
coordinated EU regulatory arrangements and security and have little to do with 
systemic aspects of carbon commodification and trading. EU countries have made 
changes to VAT operation and centralised registries. 
 
• On the carbon offset market:  Carbon ‘broking’ fraud is a high risk area. Currently 
weak regulations through traditional consumer laws provide limited protection. 
However, recent developments in standards and certification, such as the National 
Carbon Offset Standard (NCOS) and the (global) Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), 
ensure that the credits are not ‘fake’ but are, in reality, sourced from a ‘real’ carbon 
offset project. Ensuring these credits are sourced from a reputable registry also 
reduces the risk of ‘double counting’ fraud. These standards do not guarantee that 
projects themselves were not fraudulently established or monitored. 
 
• With carbon offset projects, substantial risk of fraud exists in relation to: 
 
a. Additionality: potential for misrepresentation of carbon benefits through 
fraudulent establishment of baseline emissions and carbon sequestration or 
conservation benefits; 
b. Non-permanence: potential for carbon saving projects to revert to more 
emission intensive activity or to be destroyed by fire or weather events.  
c. Procedural weaknesses in project verification and validation: In the regulated 
offset market (Kyoto), United Nations oversight is stretched and verification is 
dominated by a few large companies in a highly competitive environment and 
some verifiers are also involved in consulting for project developers. UN spot 
checks and reviewers have found many verification reports to be 
unsatisfactory in terms of project additionality, monitoring and estimation of 
carbon saved, and local consultation.  
d. Structural conditions of offset project contexts: the experience of illegal 
forestry indicates that higher risks of criminality exist in those countries with 
projects that are geographically remote, have low levels of economic 
development, weak governance and state institutions, and unclear land tenure 
systems. 
 
• Misrepresentation and fraudulent reporting of emissions by liable entities is a 
significant risk although there are few reports of this in the established EU ETS. 
 
4. Perceptions of fraud and carbon price volatility 
 
• The risk profile of a particular offset asset class will affect its prospects for inclusion 
in higher volume cap-and-trade compliance systems and its attractiveness to the 
lucrative voluntary market. Perceived risk of fraud or misrepresentation is an 
important component of quality. 
 
5. Carbon fraud risk and anticipated future market/ industry responses 
 
• Increases in oversight and regulation particularly in forestry projects in developing 
countries. On the one hand, this could be expected to raise the cost of credits but, on 
the other hand, maintain / increase fungibility. 
• Increased sophistication and application of technology (models, imaging) that 
integrate biophysical, management and financial aspects of projects to reduce chances 
of fraud. 
• Development of risk mitigation and insurance products for carbon credits to offer 
protection to participants. 
• Greater differentiation of carbon products based on quality to produce greater 
variability in values for credits and thus limit the fungibility of products. 
 
6. Future research 
 
• Development of methodological tools to enable due-diligence of (voluntary) carbon 
credits 
• Detailed examination of the carbon commodification process to establish the 
dynamics of fraud in the conversion of abatement projects to fungible credits. 
• Anticipatory research on potential tax fraud in the integration of the Australian 
emission system with the European Union. 
  
Introduction 
 
Australian companies have continued to venture into the largely unregulated voluntary 
carbon credit market to offset their emissions and / or give their customers the opportunity to 
be ‘carbon neutral’. With the instigation of the Australian compliance market and pressure 
increasing for political responses to global warming and climate change, we would expect 
Australian companies to grow their exposure to carbon products in both compliance and 
voluntary markets. This paper examines the risks of carbon fraud in these markets by 
reviewing cases of actual fraud and analysing and identifying contexts where risks of carbon 
fraud are most likely. 
 
International context for carbon trading 
 
In July 2012, the Australian government initiated the first phase of the ‘Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism’ which required entities that emit more than 25kt CO2 or equivalent, to report 
emissions and purchase Australian carbon permits. During this first phase (the fixed price 
period), companies are able to offset up to 5 per cent of their emissions using Carbon 
Farming Initiative (CFI) units. The ‘flexible price phase’ will begin in 2015 as a ‘cap-and-
trade’ system. Australia’s approach to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions control is situated 
within a broader, global approach to GHG.  
 
Driven by the doctrine of green economics and influenced by established government trade 
practices, the Kyoto Protocol formally accepted the use of a system of carbon credits to assist 
those nations unable to meet Kyoto’s carbon emission goals of reducing GHG by 5.2% on 
1990 levels by 2012. This process of certification gives states and corporations legal 
permission to release emissions into the atmosphere, with one carbon credit equalling one 
tonne of carbon dioxide. The Kyoto Protocol established upper limits or ‘emission caps’ for 
all 170 signatory countries. Large polluting nations such as China and the US have, however, 
refused to agree to mandatory caps and, according to numerous reports (see Harvey, 2011), 
the UK will exceed its projected carbon emission target. Moreover, polluting countries can 
participate in reforestation initiatives or the creation of ‘carbon sinks’ as a substitution for 
reducing emissions. 
 
The process is a trade-oriented form of control based on ‘supply and demand’ (Labatt and 
White, 2009). It was intended that rapidly developing and high polluting countries such as 
China and India would need support, while other industrialised countries would need 
incentives to meet emissions targets in a global effort to reduce greenhouse gases. Countries 
now purchase carbon credits up to their maximum emission cap. Should an annual emission 
allowance not be met, then credits may be sold on the international market in what has 
become known as the global carbon trading industry. The number of consultants and traders 
offering advice in ‘carbon finance’, ‘carbon accounting’ and ‘carbon investment’ has 
increased substantially in the past three years (see for example, The European Business 
Review, 2010). 
 
The Current and Proposed Australian Carbon Trading Systems 
Compliance markets 
 
The Clean Energy Act (2011) provided for the introduction of a three-year ‘fixed price’ 
period followed by a ‘flexible phase’ cap-and-trade system. During the fixed price period, no 
trading of permits is allowed. Liable entities (emissions above 25kt CO2 or equivalent) must 
report their GHG emissions to the Clean Energy Regulator under the National Greenhouse 
and Energy Reporting (NGER) Act (2007) and purchase Australian Carbon Units (ACU) to 
cover their emissions. The regulator may audit liable entities and alter emission numbers. 
Liable entities must acquire and surrender units by a particular date (in June and February) 
and can face significant additional costs if there is a shortfall in surrendered units. ACUs will 
cost $23.00 per tonne in 2012 to $24.50 in 2015. Whilst this is commonly called a carbon 
‘tax’, these ACU units are more like permits or allowances or, more accurately, ‘obligatory’ 
purchases since emissions from the entity create an ‘obligation’ or liability which is 
addressed through ACU purchase. Alternatively, up to 5% of this liability can be met by 
purchasing and surrendering offset credits from the CFI (termed Australian Carbon Credit 
Units (ACCU)) rather than purchasing an equivalent value in ACUs. During the ‘fixed price 
period’, ACUs issued by the regulator are automatically surrendered so they are not bankable 
or tradable. 
 
The ‘flexible-price phase’, which is a proper cap and trade system, begins in July 2015 and 
allows trading of permits and credits on the primary market. A maximum number of ACUs 
are set (the ‘cap’) and the ‘cap’ is reduced over time, increasing ACU scarcity so as to 
provide a price signal for low carbon innovation and substitution. ACUs are mostly auctioned 
to liable entities. Auctions begin in 2014 in anticipation of the ‘flexible price period’ and are 
issued through the Clean Energy Regulator. 
 
Initial legislation set a floor price for carbon of $15 per tonne to create some certainty for 
business, and also allowed up to 50% of obligations to be met through international Kyoto-
compliant offset credits – comprised mostly of credits derived from the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) – thus allowing links to the world-wide carbon markets. However, recent 
changes in the legislation have allowed for partial linking to the European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS), with Australian entities able to purchase EU allowances and 
surrender them for up to 50% of GHG emission liabilities. Although purchased allowances 
from the EU market have value in Australia, for the first three years of the flexible-priced 
phase, the reverse is not true. In other words, from 2015-2018, Australian carbon units and 
credits cannot be traded on the EU ETS. However, from 2018 full integration with the 
European market is planned.  
 
The EU ETS, the largest carbon market in the world, offers the most substantive links to 
global carbon trading. The legislative changes which permitted local exposure to the EU ETS 
have concurrently restricted the maximum allowance of Kyoto-compliant offset credits from 
a high of 50 per cent to a more manageable 12% of total emissions. In fact, this reduced level 
of potential exposure of the local market to Kyoto-compliant offset credits more closely 
reflects the proportion of allowable offsets in Phase 3 of the EU ETS (6%). Also favouring 
this adjustment is the reality that prices of international Kyoto-compliant offsets have been 
quite unstable and well below the current carbon ‘tax’ price. With the removal of the floor 
price, the Government was clearly concerned that imports of large volumes of international 
Kyoto-compliant offset credits could create a crash in the Australian market at the beginning 
of the ‘flexible price phase’.  
 
There will be no limit on the purchase and surrender of domestic offset credits (ACCUs) after 
2015. It is expected, however, that the supply of these types of credits will be limited because 
of the significant time delay in bringing these complex projects online. Because of the link to 
the EU ETS it would be expected that carbon prices in Australia for both offsets and 
allowances (ACUs) would reflect the EU ETS price and that scarcity would be mainly driven 
through the cap determination in Europe. 
 
Offset credits and voluntary markets 
 
In the Kyoto system, many offset credits are sourced from projects in developing countries 
through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This dependence of emitters on carbon 
reduction or avoidance in the poorer, developing world has been heavily criticised as a form 
of carbon ‘colonisation’ and the potential for carbon fraud and corruption (Bachram 2004). In 
the EU ETS, a certain proportion of credits (6% in Phase 3) from the CDM can contribute to 
emission liabilities of entities. 
Significant offset credit projects are, however, also developed in high emitting countries such 
as the US and Australia and both domestic and international credits serve the increasing 
voluntary market. In general, all offset credits can be purchased in the voluntary markets but 
only specifically accredited credits, such as those regulated by the CDM or other national or 
international accreditations systems (such as the Australian CFI) can be traded in the 
compliance markets (Kyoto, European ETS and proposed markets such as the Australian and 
Californian ETS). In the voluntary markets, purchases are commonly from entities that wish 
to demonstrate corporate responsibility and attract business by growing their image as 
‘environmentally friendly’ and enhanced branding (Peters-Stanley, 2008). Key buyers are 
major airlines and financial institutions (Hug and Ahammed, 2011: 13) but there is a myriad 
of smaller buyers from event organisers, community groups and individuals. For most buyers, 
offset credits are purchased and then ‘retired’ – removed from the carbon registers. Entities 
may also purchase carbon credits for investment purposes; for example, betting on future 
higher carbon prices and eventual resale or as a pre-compliance measure to enable lower-cost 
compliance by buying eligible credits early.  
What are carbon instruments? 
 
Carbon markets are artificially (socially) constructed markets that aim to internalise the costs 
of GHG pollution within firms. As such, they provide a price signal to firms that encourage 
minimisation of GHG emissions or a displacement of emission savings through offsets; that 
is, purchasing emission savings in other firms. Markets can only occur when the commodities 
being traded are commensurable and so exchange values are known and trusted. GHG 
instruments are remarkable to the extent that they represent no value as a tangible commodity 
but instead represent a permit3or, more accurately, a means of settling a liability created 
through GHG emissions (Mackenzie 2009: 448).  In creating this synthetic commodity, a 
multiplicity of projects and technologies in action must be made commensurate. Given this 
process, plus the intangibility of the instrument  and the political basis for its value, issues of 
compliance, regulation and the potential for fraud are significant concerns (Drew and Drew, 
2010).  
 
The politics of carbon fraud 
 
In assessing risks of carbon fraud, it is important to be aware that anthropogenic global 
warming is highly politicised and that claims of fraud potential and politicisation of actual 
fraud cases are in the interests of disparate political actors, from parts of the ‘green’ lobby 
who argue that carbon markets are a form of ‘commodification of nature’ to climate sceptics 
                                                 
3 Similar to a derivative (such as an option) in the financial markets 
who use carbon fraud as one of the arguments against taking action against global warming.4 
Interestingly, there is a plethora of press reports of potential fraud, claims that fraud is 
currently rampant (particularly in offset markets) and short statements on the increasing need 
for enforcement from Interpol and the Australian Federal Police. However, other than a small 
number of well-publicised cases, there is minimal specific detail on actual fraud, where it is 
occurring and how it is enabled. The exception is the well-publicised case of VAT tax fraud 
in the EU regulated carbon market. 
 
Actual Fraud Cases and Risk of Fraud 
Regulated Compliance Markets (tradeable allowances) 
 
• Seven individuals were arrested in the UK charged with VAT fraud from trading EU 
carbon allowances. They were involved in complex ‘carousel trades’ which utilised 
the VAT-free export of securities within the EU and sold them on with VAT included 
in the sale, without paying VAT to the government. This instance of VAT ‘skimming’ 
netted 38million euros but reports suggest that this type of fraud has cost the EU 
countries around 3billion euros. This huge scam has had a major effect on the market 
with large drop in transactions after the fraud was discovered.  
 
• Internet fraudsters sent emails to companies using the EU ETS registries that directed 
them to websites where they were asked to enter their identification numbers and 
passwords. These were used to sell on emission allowances. This scam, known as 
                                                 
4 See, for example, http://www.nocarbontax.com.au/2011/09/mum-and-dad-investors-beware-the-carbon-trading-honeypot/ 
‘phishing’, was reported to have costs the companies millions of euros.5 Tougher 
security arrangements have been instigated to prevent this form of cyber-fraud.  
 
• Recycling of Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits (based on offset projects in 
developing countries (CDMs)) by a Member State of the EU. 
 
 
These highly publicised fraud cases were drawn on to condemn carbon markets as inherently 
unstable and risky. However, these frauds had little to do with the systemic properties of 
carbon markets. Both VAT and internet scams have been occurring in many other fraud 
contexts. The VAT scam was mainly due to mismatches between EU-level trading 
regulations (free of VAT for export through the EU), national level VAT that varied between 
EU constituent nations, and national rather than centralised EU registries. Interestingly, this 
scam may have convinced the Australian government to remove GST from emission 
permits.6 In 2010, the EU commission issued a directive that will establish a single carbon 
allowance registry to replace member state registries7 and a proposed and reverse-charge 
VAT system to eliminated carousel fraud.8 Similarly, recycling of instruments such as CERs 
has been addressed by amendments to the Registry Regulation.9 In terms of internet fraud, it 
would be expected that, with the maturation of these markets, security levels would be similar 
to that of the financial markets. 
 
                                                 
5 http//www.euractiv.com/climate-environment/eu-approves-revised-ets-rules-com. 
6 In the initial CPRS scheme (2009), GST was included as a tax on permit purchase. 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/docs/communication_en.pdf accessed 20 March, 2012 
8 http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/legislation/proposals/taxation/com(2009)511_en.pdf Access date 22 
March 2012 
9 Commission Regulation (EU) No 920/2010. 
Emissions misreporting and fraud 
 
Emissions reporting has regularly been identified in accountant’s briefs as an area of fraud 
risk (see Deloitte, 2009: 3, Lindquist and Goldberg, 2010: 63). However, minimal 
evidence of this type of fraud exists. In the European Union, where carbon emission reporting 
has been in force for a number of years, we cannot find evidence of this type of fraud. 
Similarly, we cannot find any reports in the media in contrast to the considerable journalistic 
concern with fraud in the offset markets. It may be that there is more focus on the ‘market’ 
aspect of carbon fraud than on the considerable regulatory and state compliance framework 
which created the ‘market’ in the first place. This exceptionalism was certainly the case in 
one of the only consultant studies on the integrity of the Australian carbon pricing 
mechanisms (Bond University, 2012). Here, the capacity of the Regulator to ensure the 
integrity of emission reporting compliance was not examined and was considered ‘outside the 
scope of this report to evaluate the powers of the Regulator in monitoring, facilitating and 
enforcing compliance with the ETS’ (p44).  
 
Ensuring compliance and enforcement of emission reporting is the responsibility of the Clean 
Energy Regulator. Under the National Greenhouse Energy Reporting Act (2009), significant 
powers have been given to the Regulator to enter, inspect and search relevant premises of 
liable entities and to compel the provision of verbal or documented information. An audit 
may be ordered if the ‘... Regulator has reasonable grounds to suspect that a registered 
corporation has contravened, is contravening, or is proposing to contravene, this Act or the 
regulations’ (NGER Act, Sch. 73A). Detailed information on auditing methodologies has been 
provided by the Regulator; however, how liable entities are chosen for audit and the extent of 
examination of the emissions reports from liable entities is not apparent. 
Notwithstanding this lack of transparency, it is clear that liable entities need to consider carbon 
governance and reporting as seriously as financial and tax reporting. From a criminological 
standpoint, more research is needed to identify those areas and aspects of GHG measurement, 
integration and reporting that might be most susceptible to fraud. 
GHG Offset schemes in Compliance and Voluntary Markets 
‘Offsetting’ carbon emissions through the financing of emission reduction or emission 
‘conserving’ projects in other parts of the globe was predominantly a result of the Kyoto 
Protocol. The Protocol is a baseline-and trade market where richer countries are expected to 
meet their emission targets (baseline) by three mechanisms: firstly, by purchasing credits 
from other developed countries who have reduce emissions; secondly, by the Joint 
Implementation (JI) mechanism which allows purchasing project-based offset credits from 
other countries with binding targets; and thirdly, through the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) that allows purchasing of project offset credits from developing countries that have 
no binding emission targets (Hepburn, 2007: 379). 
Credits from offset projects are also utilised in the voluntary market. Emitting entities can 
purchase credits from carbon brokers to partially or fully offset their GHG emissions. The 
voluntary market is largely unregulated by the state and, whilst being regarded initially as the 
‘wild west’ of carbon markets, increasing self-regulation and greater standards of 
accreditation and certification have improved its standing (Hamilton et al., 2008: 53). 
Whilst much of the reported fraud has occurred in regulated compliance markets, there has 
been significant media attention and commentary from academics, police and NGOs on the 
high risk of fraud in the offset system, particularly at the project level. The level of attention 
and urgency of the rhetoric contrasts with the relatively few established cases of 
criminality.10  
Carbon Broker Fraud 
 
Alarm bells about Shift2Neutral have recently been rung by the Tribal Coalition of Mindanao who in late 
November 2010 report that a 17 month old $500 million Tricom Caraga Memorandum of Understanding 
between Shift2Neutral and Indigenous tribes of Caraga has been dissolved. The tribal people believe that 
they have been conned. This follows on from reports dates 6 October 2010 that a recently 
signed Shift2Neutral agreement in Congo was illegal.11 
 
Shift2Neutral, which claims to have worked with the Sydney Turf Club and Australian 
PGA to make their events carbon neutral, has also been accused of distributing fake 
carbon (offset) credits and providing no evidence of successfully negotiating carbon offset 
programs.12 
 
Shift2Neutral does not just retail ‘credits’ for the voluntary market; it becomes involved in 
the sourcing of them – allegedly through  deals that are not strictly illegal but rather create the 
impression of legitimacy which carries over to their credit sales.  The extent to which they 
make deals is not clear (although they obviously were involved in deal-making in The 
Philippines and The Congo). At the project level they seem to just ‘go through the motions’ 
to the degree that is warranted to convince credit purchases that there really is a source. 
Typically, they will talk to somebody with influence or with an influential title in the project 
                                                 
10 Accusations of bribery have been made in Liberia in a large carbon credits deal (charges dropped)(Global Witness 2011). In PNG and 
Peru, accusations have been made that private developers and NGO’s have been swarming the tropical forests to encourage indigenous 
leaders to sign away their rights to the forest (http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/30/peruvian-amazon-carbon-
piracy?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487). More serious were the accusations of PNG officials producing fake carbon credit certificates as a 
prop for explaining carbon credit deals to local leaders (http://www.theage.com.au/business/carbon-scandal-snares-australian-20090903-
f9yy.html) 
11 http://scammerleaks.com/2011/04/28/brett-goldsworthy-shift2neutral/ 
12 http://www.smh.com.au/environment/revealed-scandal-of-carbon-credit-firm-20110407-1d6a4.html, 28 March 2011, Australian TV station Today 
Tonight Adelaide broadcast. 
country, such as the Congo senator in the example below or a particular tribal elder and then 
write a press release regarding the deal even though it seems that these partners rarely have 
the authority to deliver the project.  The case of the Congo deal is instructive. The principal 
of Shift2Neutral, Peter Goldsworthy released the following press statement on his web site: 
 
‘Shift2Neutral and its partners sign an exclusive environmental contract with the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo through its Provinces, Tribal Chiefs, Land Owners and the spokesperson of the senate has signed a 
progressive (step by step) agreement with Shift2Neutral for environment and renewable energy to protect the 
forests, flora and fauna and improve the standard of living to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.’ 
In Shift2Neutral’s view, two separate signings took place: 
1. Shift2Neutral and its partners (whoever they are) signed an ‘environmental contract’ 
with the Democratic Republic of the Congo through its Provinces, Tribal Chiefs and 
Land Owners. 
2. The spokesperson of the senate signed an agreement with Shift2Neutral. This 
agreement is ‘progressive’ (step by step) for ‘environment and renewable energy’. 
 
However, shortly after, the Minister declared the agreement ‘null and void’ and illegal. This 
was never reported on the Shift2Neutral website.  
 
Credibility is developed through these statements and press releases but there is no evidence 
that links their retail credits with a legitimate source. REDD-monitor, an NGO that is very 
aware of projects recognised under the UN Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation programme (UN-REDD) , can never find any official agreements and 
suggest that, if Shift2Neutral was really doing these publicised deals, it would be the biggest 
REDD operator in the world. Goldsworthy has been questioned on the sources of the credits 
but has been unable to specifically match credits with their source. This ‘alienation’ of the 
tradable credit from the project source is a particular problem with carbon-related crimes and 
is discussed in more detail in the examination of Kyoto-based credits. 
 
 Shift2Neutral is one of many brokers operating in the voluntary (offset) carbon market and is 
a classic example of a high-risk broker. A cursory examination of its website reveals that it 
provides ‘its own certification standard and solution’13. Similarly, description of projects is 
mainly in terms of broad types of projects rather than any specifics about location and how 
the project generates carbon savings.  
Those who purchase credits supplied through fraudulent brokers can no longer plead 
ignorance as an excuse. Numerous certification regimes exist and the Australian Government 
has just released its National Carbon Offset Standards (NCOS). Any purchase of credits not 
certified through these schemes is taking considerable risk. Further, NGOs are increasingly 
playing a role in monitoring carbon schemes such as Carbon Offset Watch (linked to Choice 
magazine) and REDD-monitor. Carbon Offset Watch recommends that: 
• ‘Only buy offsets from offset retailers who provide detailed information about their products and 
services, and the projects they use to generate offsets. Projects may be in Australia or overseas. 
• Choose offsets that are independently accredited by a recognised scheme or standard. Of those included 
in Carbon Offset Watch, we consider offsets accredited under the international Gold Standard and 
Clean Development Mechanism to be the best quality. Offsets accredited by VCS, VER+ and 
Greenhouse Friendly are also of a very high quality. Many voluntary carbon retailers are flexible and 
can get different kinds of offsets on request. 
                                                 
13 https://www.shift2neutral.com/certification.php 
• Choose offsets that are listed in a registry that tracks ownership of the offset and records that the offset 
has been removed from the market. This helps to ensure that the offset you bought is not sold again.’14 
The last point is particularly important since registry listing helps prevents ‘double counting’ 
of credits. 
Whilst the above criteria can help prevent fraud by the broker, fraud at the project level is still 
thought to be possible, even in the most rigorous offset project types such as the CDM’s 
(Bachram, 2004; Drew and Drew, 2010). It is at the project level where media commentaries 
about fraud are directed and where NGOs and police are most concerned. 
Investment and carbon price rebate scams  
 
The modus operandi in these scams is ‘cold calling’ either through email or telephone. In 
2011, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) reported a fake 
carbon credits investment scheme that cost investors AUD 3.5 million (AUSTRAC, 2011: 
28-29). The victims of the scheme were mostly small business investors and self-funded 
retirees who were interested in ethical investments. Telemarketers made unsolicited calls and 
discussed environmental concerns with the aim of drawing them in to the investment’s 
(scam) scheme. If interested, investors would be contacted by a representative of a Japanese-
based investment scam business who would offer them the opportunity to invest in overseas 
carbon credits. Those that took up the offer would be asked to transfer money to accounts in 
Taiwan and China. A professional website had been constructed to allow victims to view 
their investment certificates. AUSTRAC attention to the scam was initiated by (two) very 
large follow-up transfers. Victims subsequently reported that they had no access to their 
certificates and they could not be liquidated.  
                                                 
14 http://www.carbonoffsetwatch.org.au/tips-for-buying-offsets 
Similar investment scams have been found overseas, particularly in countries with high 
visibility compliance and voluntary carbon emissions trading schemes. The high public 
awareness of the monetisation of carbon seems to lead to opportunities for scammers to 
attract ‘investment’ money. The Financial Services Authority in the UK has recently alerted 
the public about a host of fraudulent carbon investment schemes that are offered to investors 
by salespeople, emails, telephone and postal mail or even by ‘word of mouth’15. 
 
The Australian Government’s SCAMwatch has provided recent warnings to the public to be 
cautious when telephoned and offered rebates on the recently introduced carbon price.16 Most 
compensation for the carbon price introduction has (and will) occur through changes in the 
tax system; however, because of the relative newness of the system and uncertainty created 
through robust oppositional discourse, there is a significant level of confusion that can be 
exploited by scammers. Victims most often give their personal banking details to the caller 
who is impersonating a Government official. 
 Fraud in Certified Offset Projects 
 
Because few reported cases of fraud have occurred, we will use reported cases of 
misrepresentation and systemic failure in offset projects to identify and discuss vulnerabilities 
for carbon fraud.  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 “Carbon credit trading” 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/consumerinformation/scamsandswindles/investment_scams/carbon_credit -  updated 
16/8/2012 
16 www.scamwatch.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemid/979119 - updated Aug 2012 
1. Establishment of Additionality 
The requirement for additionality is one of the most controversial aspects of offset projects 
because it requires the establishment of an ‘imaginary’ emissions future (baseline) to be 
extrapolated from the current emissions context. As such, it is susceptible to 
misrepresentation and a relatively easy target for fraud (Barr, 2011: 331-333). Figures 1a and 
1b illustrate the expectation for a GHG offset project in terms of additionality. In Figure 1a, 
the offset project actually reduces emissions compared to the expected baseline scenario. An 
example of this is the implementation of projects that increase energy efficiency, such as for 
more efficient cooking stoves for local communities.17 In Figure 1b, the offset project acts to 
maintain baseline emissions by replacing an alternate emission-producing activity (that would 
have occurred);for example, the production and sale of carbon credits from a protected forest 
that in normal circumstances would have been logged / burned / cleared. Emissions 
reductions and baseline are not determined on a regional or national level but on a project 
basis. The types of systemic failure and misrepresentation include (see Barr, 2011 and 
Brown, 2011): 
 
• Perverse incentive structure that can motivate project developers to maximise carbon 
credit returns by maximising emissions prior to project so as to increase the 
‘imaginary’ future baseline. The most prominent example of this is the incentive (in 
developing countries) to keep producing potent GHGs such as hydroflurocarbons 
(HFC-23) because of the low cost of destruction compared to the huge receipt of 
carbon credits. In 2008, HFC-23 offset comprised 55% of CER credits issued by in 
the CDM. Credits derived from HFC projects are no longer exchangeable on the EU 
ETS. 
                                                 
17 This project is one supported by Qantas in its offset portfolio 
• Incentives at the national government policy level and through taxation are also 
perverse. In the case of HFC-23 abatement, rather than governments in developing 
countries prohibiting their production, they instead take advantage of the scheme 
through imposition of high taxes on credits issued. Further, the piecemeal project-by-
project approval of additionality takes little consideration of national level policy 
which may (in the case of China) be committed to emission reduction and increasing 
renewable energy18 – in the absence of the CDM or other offset schemes. Hence, the 
actual ‘imaginary’ baseline may be well below that determined at the local level. 
Whilst China has committed to renewables, in 2007, all new projects based on 
renewables or lower carbon emitters had applied for CER credits (Wara and Victor, 
2008:13). 
 
• Earlier empirical studies of additionality of CDM offset projects have indicated that 
up to 40% of projects (averaged from 2004-2006) which amounted to 20% of CERs 
had questionable additionality (Schnieder, 2007: 9). Brown (2010: 249) cites a 
number of other questionable approaches to CDM offset projects such as: a survey of 
governments, NGOs and project developers which indicated that 71% of respondents 
thought that many CDM projects would have been implemented in the absence of 
CDM; another study of 52 Indian projects found that only a third of projects had 
evaluated the ‘availability of sufficient investment capital in the absence of the CDM’ 
(ibid:9); and a study of hydropower projects in 2007 which found that most were not 
‘additional’. 
 
  
                                                 
18 China’s goal is to generate 20% of its power by renewables by 2020 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1a: Offset project reduces GHG emissions from estimated baseline 
 
 
Figure 1b: Offset project maintains current GHG emissions as compared to expected increase 
without offset project 
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The problem of additionality is an inherent weakness in offset projects, the extent of which 
will vary in accordance with the locational and technical details of the project itself. Projects 
most susceptible are those that provide credits for maintaining particular emission levels 
(such as forest sink conservation) where the calculations of additionality are based on 
assumptions of future use that may degrade the sink. One can imagine situations where local 
collusion might occur in relation to future land use and, in establishing a baseline, propose 
sink degradation activities that may never have been undertaken in reality.  
 
The other component of additionality is the estimation of carbon benefits from the proposed 
project. Whilst this is less subjective than determining the baseline, it is possible that various 
forms of corruption and organised criminal activity could influence the verification process. 
As in the case of baseline misrepresentation or fraud, projects at risk include those where 
carbon verification is difficult and complex and perhaps methodologically novel. Barr (2011: 
Predicted base-line 
no offset project 
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Predicted GHG reductions 
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335), drawing on earlier work by Ross (2001), also makes the point that powerful state actors 
could find it financially rewarding to over-report emissions for short periods of time. 
 
2. Non-permanence 
 
Non-permanence is considered a significant risk for carbon offsets. Most of the concern is 
related to natural events such as fire and weather. It is quite conceivable that carbon sinks 
could be exploited for other products through poor monitoring and project governance 
systems that allow partial or complete destruction for alternate economic gain. 
 
3. Systemic procedural vulnerability 
 
There are a number of studies (Barr, 2011; Brown, 2010; Drew and Drew, 2010) that point to 
the vulnerability of verification and validation processes in the CDM process, the largest 
offset scheme. Significantly, credits from these projects (CERs) are fungible with the largest 
carbon trading system, the EU ETS. They are also traded in secondary markets. 
 
Attention to deficits in the CDM process was heightened in 2006 when spot checks by UN 
inspectors found significant irregularities in work by three prominent verifiers (Schneider, 
2007: 24). In fact, a general review of verifiers’ reports indicated:  
 
‘From [the] review of available documentation it appears that current methodological 
guidance from the Board is either not applied or, if applied, is not always documented. ... 
Validation reports for some registered CDM projects indicate that efforts to corroborate 
additionality claims were undertaken, other cases with no such indications were found ... The 
available documentation provides little evidence of external validation by DOEs of key 
assumptions and data used for additionality assessment, though such evidence may exist 
elsewhere.’19 
 
In 2009, UN inspectors suspended the largest verifier, SGS UK, because of poor quality 
documentation and lack of adequate qualifications of their staff. 
 
The process of verification is integral to safeguarding against fraud. However, the offset 
verification industry is very price competitive with revenue per project declining and verifiers 
highly dependent on the project developers (Brown, 2010). As project developers try to cut 
costs, they search for the verifiers with the lowest fees with the issue of verification quality 
not being considered an important price factor. Furthermore, oversight of verifiers by CDM is 
limited by insufficient resources (Schneider, 2007). Concerns have also been expressed 
regarding firms providing consulting advice to project developers and acting as verifiers for 
the project (Bachram, 2004: 5). 
 
The case of the CDM programme is instructive for all other verified offset projects. Incentive 
structures should encourage objective verification and oversight from regulators and needs to 
be robust and sufficiently resourced. 
 
4. Stakeholder consultation 
 
A particularly vulnerable area for fraud and corruption is the potential for various forms of 
pressure to be applied on local people. Whilst we have found no reported examples of this in 
the establishment of carbon offset programmes, Schneider’s (2007: 51-53) review of 
stakeholder consultation in CDMs is critical of the lack of detail and concern for the local 
                                                 
19 Meeting report of the twenty-third meeting of the CDM Methodological Panel 
people who might be affected. Only 40% of project development documents had invited all 
relevant stakeholders to comment on the project. 
 
CDM projects must also be approved at the national level by the Designated National 
Authority (DNA). Criteria for approval, provided by the UN, are simply that the project 
achieves sustainable development objectives. Brown (2010: 250) suggests that because DNA 
can accept or reject projects in the absence of decision making rules, the fortunes of a project 
could be influenced by bribery. 
 
Accusations of illegality in offset projects have mainly been in tropical forest contexts in 
developing countries (see footnote 10). Here, the structural conditions for fraud and 
corruption (discussed below) mean that projects could be more risky and that the 
establishment of ‘carbon credit’ forests could occur through deception or bribery. 
 
5. Structural conditions for fraud and corruption 
 
In the absence of documented fraud cases, risks of carbon fraud can be ascertained by 
understanding the structural conditions under which fraud and corruption proliferate. 
Substantial amounts of criminological literature can be sourced in this respect, particularly in 
the area of illegal forestry (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002). Some of the important conditions 
are: 
 
• Geographical remoteness – projects undertaken in remote areas distant from public 
scrutiny and difficult to monitor. Remoteness affects the capacity of governing 
institutions to adequately administer projects and to enforce the law. Fraudulent 
activities in remote areas are less likely to be identified and punished. 
 
• Low levels of economic development – where a country or province lacks 
sophisticated monitoring of resources and can afford only a small and poorly trained 
bureaucracy. Policing and intelligence services are weak, poorly trained and poorly 
paid. Unstable, inexperienced and poorly financed public sectors are more likely to be 
involved in bribery and corruption. 
  
• Weak governance – governance structures that are disparate, poorly organised or 
stretched over large areas with inadequate lines of responsibility and accountability. 
Criminals can exploit small isolated pockets of administrators and police through 
bribery and corruption. 
 
• Unclear land tenure systems – under-developed land registers and tenure systems and 
complex community-based or customary land ownership systems20 can be exploited 
by criminals who are intent on land grabs or ‘divide-and-conquer’ approaches to 
gaining power over land ownership.  
 
Most of the above conditions occur in countries where the newly accredited UN ‘Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’ (REDD+) programme will occur. This 
programme produces carbon credits for forest sink conservation and development, and 
expects to supply funds between US$17-33billion every year, much of which will be destined 
for forest-rich developing countries. The programme is not just project-based but intends to 
                                                 
20 It has been estimated that over 2 billion customary land owners are not recognised by national laws (Wily, 2008) 
compensate governments, communities, companies and individuals in developing countries 
which undertake to reduce emissions loss from forests. The huge sums of money involved 
and structural conditions in these countries (see above) have NGOs greatly concerned with 
potential fraud; corruption and bribery (see Global Witness, 2011). The significance of 
REDD+-originated carbon credits will increase markedly in 2012 when the EU ETS 
preferentially requires credits from developing countries. 
 
Perceptions of fraud and carbon price volatility 
 
Risks of fraud (whether real or perceived) will ultimately influence pricing in the carbon 
market. This section elaborates on price sensitivity and volatility to a number of political and 
social factors including risk and the perceived quality of the carbon product. 
 
Because of the fragmentation of global carbon markets and the limited transactional 
connections, carbon pricing can vary markedly and can be extremely volatile. Pricing by 
market participants is more acutely affected by perceptions of legislative change and political 
(un)certainty particularly in early development of markets such as in the USA (World Bank 
2011). Here assorted project offset credits derived from the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) 
which operates globally and the Climate Action Reserve (CAR) varied markedly in price 
depending on perceptions of their acceptability for offset transactions in cap-and-trade 
schemes (such as the Californian cap-and-trade scheme). For example, in the US, the globally 
operating VCS was considered to be less acceptable than US-legislated schemes. Because the 
VCS trading scheme was not legislated in the US, its offset carbon credits were priced at less 
than half ($2.40/t) the price of allowable offset credits for the Californian market 
(Californian-based CRTs were priced at between $5.50 and $6.90/t). As the market lost 
confidence in the likelihood of a federal scheme, VCS credits declined another 40%. 
Similarly, pricing on offset credits based on different types of offsets also vary significantly; 
for example, CAR-based offsets in the USA varied from $5.90/t for national forestry to 
$3.50/t for landfill gas.  
 
Whilst the above examples of price variance are probably greater than in more mature, 
consolidated markets, they do denote the sensitivity of price to risk – primarily here to 
transactional acceptability and hence demand. Offset credits created from schemes perceived 
to have no (or limited) tradability in the large cap-and-trade markets can only participate in 
voluntary schemes that (at present) are relatively small. 
 
The acceptability of tradable credits from offset schemes is a complicated matter. Different 
markets have different criteria for offset credits often based on political pressure regarding 
the importance (or not) of reducing in situ or domestic emissions, and also the perceived 
quality of the projects from which the credits are derived. There is little research here. 
However, there is considerable argument in the NGO literature regarding the social 
acceptability of various projects and the potential for fraud, misrepresentation and 
mismanagement (for example, Densham et al., 2009). Under fragmented carbon trading 
conditions, where price has little to do with theoretical CO2 abatement demand and supply,21 
one would expect that perceptions of fraud could contribute to the variation in carbon price.  
 
Similarly, price volatility and sensitivity to political decisions could expose carbon trading 
and related financial instruments to higher levels of insider trading.22 The significant size of 
                                                 
21 That is significant numbers of credits cannot be traded in large markets such as the EU ETS 
22 In a related incident, considerable insider trading was suspected from the sudden rise in the share prices of steel manufacturers OneSteel 
and BlueScope just before the steel industry support package was announced by the government. http://www.smh.com.au/business/carnon-
tax-and-insider-trading-looking-for-the-needle in-the smokestack/ 20/3/2012 
government bureaucracies and there capacity to ‘leak’ could mean that highly advantageous 
market information could find its way to unscrupulous traders prior to government 
announcements to the market. 
 
The absence of compliance trading systems in many countries and the growing social 
awareness of the impact of climate change have created a growing market for the voluntary 
carbon offset market. The primary market here is for voluntary purchases from entities which 
wish to demonstrate corporate responsibility and attract business by growing their image as 
‘environmentally friendly’ and enhanced branding. To achieve this, offset credits are 
purchased and then ‘retired’ – removed from the carbon registers. Entities may also purchase 
carbon credits for investment purposes; for example, betting on future higher carbon prices 
and eventual resale, or as a pre-compliance measure to enable lower-cost compliance by 
buying eligible credits early. 
 
There is significant differentiation of carbon offset products and price is very much related to 
perceived quality of the projects such as the incorporation of sustainable development 
criteria, benefits for local people and their environment and relatively free from fraud risk. 
This has led to high priced specialist ‘boutique’ carbon markets driven by buyers from 
developed countries being active in times of excess credits and / or buyers wanting to 
increase their public image through projects that promote strong environmental and social 
benefits (Bumpus 2011: 623). A part of ensuring quality is through purchasing from registries 
that ensure transparency and reduce the risk of double counting of credits. Further, 
certification by reputable verification standards, such as the Voluntary Gold Standard (VGS), 
promotes a positive image to the purchaser and reduces risk of mismanaged or fraudulent 
projects being funded. 
Concluding comments: Developments in risk management 
 
The most likely scenario for carbon market development is an increasing establishment of 
small regional / sectoral cap-and-trade systems, expansion of secondary carbon markets based 
on both voluntary and compliance primary markets and an expanding voluntary offset sector. 
Risk (including fraud risk) is a major concern in market development. The risk profile of a 
particular offset asset class will affect its prospects to be included in higher volume cap-and-
trade compliance systems and its attractiveness to the lucrative voluntary market. 
 
Several developments in carbon markets will influence the risk profile and costs of carbon 
products including: 
 
• REDD+ programmes: Increasing levels of oversight and regulation are being 
supported by many commentators particularly with the development of the UN 
‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’ (REDD+) 
programme, much of which will occur in developing countries. NGOs in particular 
are concerned that, without significant funding for governance development, law 
reform and institutional capacity and improved accounting and regulatory oversight, 
REDD+ projects and funds could be at significant risk from fraud and corruption 
(Global Witness 2011: 2) 
 
• Clean Development Mechanism: Increasing calls for greater UN oversight and clear 
entity separation between project developers and verifiers.  
 
• Increasing sophistication of technology in simulating and measuring carbon flows and 
greater access to imaging technologies in developing countries. Technology-mediated 
carbon accounting could reduce the ‘subjectivity’ of carbon accounting and reduce the 
chance of misrepresentation and fraud in estimating carbon emissions. Fully 
integrated carbon balance – management – financial models such as FULLCAM 
developed by the CSIRO have been used in the development of forestry conservation 
projects such as the Native Forest Protection Project in Tasmania. These integrated 
models are able to incorporate probabilities of unexpected emissions such as fire, and 
more accurately predict carbon credit production over the life of the project. 
 
• Development of risk mitigating and insurance products to manage risk. Insurance 
products are available for project developers to protect against loss of carbon from 
fire and weather events.23 Changes in the EU criteria for eligible credits and the 
broader sense of ‘policy’ risk for project developers and offset buyers has seen the 
early development of insurance schemes that protect against ineligibility for cap-and-
trade schemes.24 This may protect project credits that suddenly become ineligible 
because of fraud or perceptions of fraud. 
 
• Related to this is the tendency for risky projects to deposit a proportion of credits as a 
buffer into an accreditation registry ‘to be held to insure against the potential loss of 
offsets’ (World Bank 2011: 58). Again it is not clear how this would deal with credit 
loss due to fraudulent projects. 
 
                                                 
23 See http://www.if.net.au/public/carbon.html 
24 http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2045953/worlds-carbon-credit-insurance-launched 
• Internalisation of risk into credit price through either differentiation of credit products 
according to risk and ‘quality’ or a discounting factor that reduces the GHG 
equivalent for an offset project according to risk. Hence, projects judged to be more 
risky would only receive a proportion of GHG saved in credits. 
 
There are two predominant tensions in the carbon markets that may further determine how 
risk is avoided, minimalized or incorporated into the market. These include: 
 
• the tension between the supply of finance for the offset sector in relation to the offset 
credit demand from the compliance sector (Kyoto and EU ETS) and the risk profiles 
of products. On the one hand, because of the difficult and tenuous nature of carbon 
commodification, transaction costs are quite high and the calls for increased 
regulation and oversight to deal with issues such as fraud will increase these costs and 
could affect the supply of credits in situations of low carbon prices in the compliance 
markets. On the other hand, degradation in quality of offsets through inadequate 
oversight could lead to rejection by compliance markets and increasing risk for 
voluntary purchasers. 
 
• the tension between fungible carbon products to enable more integrated global 
markets and stable GHG prices that more adequately reflect demand and supply of 
permits / credits – as against a fragmentation and differentiation of carbon products 
that enable price to reflect quality issues such as sustainable development and low risk 
(including fraud) profiles. 
 
Concluding Comments: Further Research and Development 
 
• In the absence of regulation, the development of a methodological tool for appraising 
carbon fraud risk in offset credits in the voluntary markets would contribute to 
avoiding fraud in the voluntary market. This could operate as a form of due-diligence 
for investors and for use in offsetting. 
 
• An examination in more detail of the carbon commodification process in terms of 
susceptibility to fraud. It is apparent that some of the most substantial fraud risks arise 
because of the dissolution of links between specific emission abatement projects and 
the credits they produce on the market. 
 
• Fraud implications with integration of the Australian emission trading system with the 
EU ETS, particularly in regard to differing tax regimes. More generally, the operation 
of fragmented global markets and the entry of new schemes may have implications 
for carbon fraud.  
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